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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

191503Z

DIST 19 DECEMBER 1966

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA/NORTH KOREA

DOI: OCTOBER 1966

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON THE VIETNAM  
SITUATION AND RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS FOREIGN  
COUNTRIES.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. SUMMARY. [REDACTED]

DE

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

GAULLE'S EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION WERE AIMED TOWARDS  
A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND [REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

4/21/98

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
(classification) (dissem controls)

GOING TO CAPITALIZE ON FRENCH-AMERICAN RIVALRY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. CHINA WAS PRESSING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO APPEASE THE "REVISIONISTS." [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM NEEDED MATERIALS AND NOT VOLUNTEERS, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHOM WOULD BRING MANY PROBLEMS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH NORTH KOREA HAD SENT SOME EXPERTS TO VIETNAM, KOREA COULD NOT HELP NORTH VIETNAM VERY MUCH BECAUSE IT HAD DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDONESIA COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE ANYTHING CONCRETE IF IT MEDIATED IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION AND [REDACTED] IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR DIRECT TALKS TO BE HELD WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]  
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. EFFORTS OF DE GAULLE. [REDACTED] THE  
MOTIVES FOR FRENCH MOVES IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WERE NOT  
ENTIPELY CLEAR BUT [REDACTED] DE GAULLE  
LIKE EVERY FRENCHMAN KNEW THE VIETNAMESE MENTALITY VERY  
WELL THROUGH HISTOPICAL EXPERIENCE AND THIS MIGHT BE THE  
REASON DE GAULLE WAS TRYING TO GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THE  
OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. [REDACTED]  
DE GAULLE PROBABLY HAD IN MIND A KIND OF COALITION GOVERN-  
MENT WHICH WOULD IN THE END SUBMERGE INTO THE UNIFICATION  
OF VIETNAM. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN FAVOR OF THE SOCIALIST  
SYSTEM BUT IT WOULD NEUTRALIZE VIETNAM. FURTHERMORE, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] DE GAULLE WAS WAITING FOR  
THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY TO INTERFEPE IN BRINGING ABOUT A  
SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR BECAUSE IF HE ACTED TOO SOON,  
THE FRENCH FEAPED THEY MIGHT LOSE THEIR ASSETS AND INVEST-  
MENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IF HE ACTED TOO LATE HE WOULD  
LOSE NOUTH VIETNAM'S "SYMPATHY." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE NOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

DE GAULLE'S IDEAS AND EFFORTS BUT WOULD ON THE CONTRARY  
MAKE AS MUCH USE AS POSSIBLE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
(classification) (dissem controls)

VIEWPOINT AND PIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE. [REDACTED] AS TO WHETHER THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE INFLUENCED THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED] THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

THERE WAS SOME RELUCTANCE IN THE SOVIET BLOC TO ASSIST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT SEVEPAL TIMES HAD STATED THAT THE WAR AND ITS EFFECTS WERE NOT A PURELY VIETNAMESE AFFAIR BUT WAS A COMMON CAUSE FOR ALL SOCIALIST STATES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE VIENAM WAR WAS A TEST CASE AS TO WHETHER WORLD COMMUNISM WOULD SUCCEED OR NOT. PEOPLE WERE ALWAYS TALKING ABOUT "INTERNATIONAL DUTY" AND "INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT" BUT THESE WORDS WERE THEORETICAL AND WERE NOT ALWAYS PUT INTO PRACTICE.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

5. [REDACTED] COMMUNIST CHINA ALWAYS PRESSED NORTH VIETNAM NOT TO MAKE ANY APPEASEMENT WITH THE "REVISIONISTS" AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT LIKE THIS KIND OF PRESSURE. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SURELY KNEW WHAT TO DO AND COULD HANDLE MATTERS THEMSELVES AND DID NOT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]  
(classification) (dissem controls)

WANT TO BE DICTATED TO BY ANYBODY ELSE. HOWEVER, CHINA ALWAYS COOPERATED FULLY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE WAR MATERIALS PROBLEM AND ASSISTED AS MUCH AS THEY COULD AFFORD. ALSO, [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO SUCH BARRIERS TO TRANSPORTATION OF SOVIET AID ACROSS CHINA AS THE SOVIETS CLAIMED IN THEIR PRESS. NO OBSTACLES WERE PUT IN THE WAY BY THE CHINESE IN THE TRANSPORT OF SOVIET WEAPONS. BEFORE, THERE WERE SOME IRREGULARITIES BUT THEY HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF AND PRESENTLY TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS WERE BEING "SAFEGUARDED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES." HOWEVER, PAUL TRANSPORTATION WAS DIFFICULT AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD THEREFORE ASKED COUNTRIES SENDING AID TO MOVE THE MATERIALS BY SHIP WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND "NOT TO BE FRIGHTENED EVEN BY THE SEVENTH FLEET." [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM WAS RECEIVING ONLY ONE-TENTH OF THE AMOUNT OF AID BEING GIVEN TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT BY THE UNITED STATES. NORTH VIETNAM BADLY NEEDED MATERIALS. THEREFORE, IT HAD ASKED EAST EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WHY THEY WERE KEEPING THEIR EQUIPMENT ONLY FOR THEMSELVES AND STOCK-PILING IT INSTEAD OF TRYING IT OUT ON A LARGE SCALE IN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

VIETNAM THE WAY THE AMERICANS DO.

6. WITH REGARD TO BLOC COUNTRIES' VOLUNTEERS, THERE WERE OBSTACLES TO ACCEPTING THEM. THERE WERE THE QUESTIONS OF WHO WOULD COMMAND JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS, WHETHER VOLUNTEERS WERE COMPLETELY PREPARED TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST WORLD ON VIETNAMESE GROUND, AND WHETHER THEY COULD BE TRUSTED TO DEFEND SPECIAL SECTORS ASSIGNED TO THEM. THE MAIN PROBLEM CONCERNED THE CHARACTER AND MENTALITY OF THE VOLUNTEER GROUPS CONSISTING OF DIFFERENT RACES AND IN GENERAL THE EUROPEAN FEELING OF SUPERIORITY OVER ASIANS. [REDACTED] AT PRESENT NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT NEED VOLUNTEERS BUT ONLY NEEDED MATERIALS. ONLY THE EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO GIVE IT BECAUSE ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAD ONLY SMALL CAPABILITIES WHICH IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO EXPECT THEM TO SHARE MORE THAN NECESSARY.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

7. NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NORTH KOREA COULD NOT DO MUCH FOR NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE IT HAD SO MANY DIFFICULTIES AT HOME. HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA ALWAYS CALLED FOR UNITY AMONG THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ON THE VIETNAM WAR. NORTH KOREA WAS FACING THE EXPANSION PROBLEM AND PENETRATION OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM INTO

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]  
(classification) (dissem controls)

SOUTH KOREA. SINCE IT WAS FORMERLY A JAPANESE COLONY, NORTH KOREA FEARED A POSSIBLE NEW EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM AND THERE WAS A GREAT POSSIBILITY OF INVASION FROM SOUTH KOREA. THUS, THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT: ON THEIR FRONT DOORSTEP WERE THE SOUTH KOREANS SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE JAPANESE, ON THEIR BACK DOORSTEP WERE THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS BOTH PRESSURING TO GET NORTH KOREA INTO THEIR OWN SPHERE. THE NORTH KOREANS TRYING TO EXECUTE AN INDEPENDENT POLICY MADE THE STATEMENT OF 2 AUGUST 1966 STRESSING THAT THERE MUST BE FULL INDEPENDENCE AND EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, LARGE OR SMALL. BECAUSE THE KOREANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT SENDING MANPOWER, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ALLOWED THEM TO SEND EXPERTS IN ALL FIELDS TO VIETNAM, INCLUDING THE MILITARY FIELD, TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM IN CASE VOLUNTEERS WERE SENT LATER. [REDACTED] NORTH KOREA HAD SUPPLIED A FEW WEAPONS SUCH AS LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES OF NORTH KOREAN MANUFACTURE AND ALSO ROLLING STOCK, TRACTORS, TEXTILES, AND MEDICINES.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

## 8. NORTH VIETNAM-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. [REDACTED]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

PREVIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WERE  
BASED ON TRADITION AND STRENGTHENED BY SUKARNO AND HO CHI  
MINH WERE SPOILED BY THE INDONESIAN COUP D'ETAT BUT THIS WAS  
ONLY TEMPORARY. INDONESIA'S ACTING AS MEDIATOR  
IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WOULD NEVER ACHIEVE ANYTHING CONCRETE;  
IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE "IMPERIALISTS" TO ARRANGE A DIRECT  
TALK WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION  
WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY TALKS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

REGRETTED THE PRESENT INDONESIAN FOREIGN  
POLICY BECAUSE IT HARMED THE VIETNAM SITUATION WITH INDONESIA  
COMPROMISING WITH THE "IMPERIALISTS" AND ALSO THE CESSATION  
OF THE CONFRONTATION POLICY AGAINST MALAYSIA WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS  
TO THE VIETNAM WAR.

9. DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIP CINCPAC PACFLT APPAC  
PACAF

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L